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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In refusing to give the earlier decision res judicata effect, the
court was restating the settled law in New York: "Res judicata
effect is not given to a legal proceeding unless there has been a
final judgment." 229
The dissent, while agreeing that the doctrine of res judicata
does not generally apply in the absence of the entry of a final judgment, would have been willing to endorse an exception to the rule
making a decision or verdict binding because of the parties'
acquiescence to it. 2 0 The dissent felt that an exception should be
allowed in the instant case, especially in light of the recent pragmatic approach
to the doctrine of res judicata by the Court of
12 1
Appeals.
Where, as in the instant case, the issues have been previously
litigated, and only the ministerial function of entering judgment
remains, it seems that there is little to be gained from a technical
application of res judicata principles.1 22 Not only is the refusal
to afford a res judicata defense unfair to the defendant, but the
12 3
liberal spirit of recent Court of Appeals decisions in the area
is circumvented.
Res judicata: Principle applies even where prior court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to reach and affect legal
interests.124 Before a court may effectively render a judgment, it
must have jurisdiction over the persons or things involved, as well as subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., competency
to decide the particular litigation in question. The judgment
of a court proceeding without these two prerequisites is
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120 Mandracchia v. Russo, 53 Misc. 2d 1018, 1020, 280 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1967). In support of this proposition the court cited
Kannel v. Kennedy, 94 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1937).
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122New York recognizes the following exception to the general rule:
"In certain instances the final judgment requirement is ignored. When an
order adjudicating a fully litigated and central motion in the first action
determines the subject matter of the second action and the order was not
subject to modification at a later point in the first suit, it is binding on the
parties in the subsequent suit. Similarly, when an issue is heard before a
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subject to attack either directly or collaterally 1 25 in a subsequent
action even though res judicata would otherwise be a defense.
While this is true as a general rule, if the lack of jurisdiction
is specifically put into issue in the first action, the court's determination of its own jurisdiction is conclusive. In this case, the
court's finding
can be attacked by direct appeal, but not by col1 26
lateral attack.
Friedman v. State' 27 is an illustration of this proposition. In
Friedman, the claimant, a removed supreme court justice, sought
to recover back salary, contending that the Court on the Judiciary
was incompetent to remove him because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Claims held that while the claim was
ostensibly an action at law for accrued salary, it was, in actuality,
a collateral attack upon the jurisdiction of the Court on the
judiciary. Since Friedman had litigated the issue of that court's
jurisdiction while before it, his proper remedy was by direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals. No direct appeal having been taken,
the doctrine of res judicata precluded an exercise of jurisdiction
by the Court of Claims, thus forcing a dismissal of the claim.
Collateral estoppel: Defensive use of doctrine in derivative
liability case.
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel provides that since nonparties and non-privies are not bound by a judgment, normally
they cannot attempt to benefit therefrom. 2
Recent years have
seen a gradual erosion of the doctrine. Frequently, persons who
were not parties or privies to a prior litigation have been permitted to assert the prior judgment as res judicata against an
adversary, even though they would not have been bound had the
prior result been to the contrary.' 29 The original exceptions to
the doctrine of mutuality were found in derivative liability cases
involving suits brought against the absentee owners of automobiles
to recover for the alleged negligence of their operators. 2 0 At
first, these owners, whose liability was derived from their operator's conduct, were allowed to rely on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel defensively. 13' More recently, the Court of Appeals has
allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel in these derivative
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'3'See, e.g., Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9
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